Brushworks
Brief us

Political strategy and data, at human resolution

Elections are decided by people, not demographics. We work at that scale.

Brushworks is a political intelligence firm. We model how individual voters behave, determine what would move each of them, and put persuasion into the field with a standard of proof — across the United States and in the harder theaters abroad.

  1. 1. The file
  2. 2. Signals resolve
  3. 3. Deciders surface
  4. 4. A program in field
Plate IFour thousand people as the voter file sees them: identical rows, nothing to tell one from another.
500+contests, from presidential to school board, over a decade
96%won, across every level and both parties
$5B+approved in more than a hundred bond and levy measures
270M+American adults and households, resolved and behaviorally scored
12countries of institutional and diaspora work
7offices on a single 24-hour desk
The premise

Most campaigns still buy the electorate the way television networks sold it in 1985: by age, sex, county and party file. Those labels are easy to purchase and easy to defend in a budget meeting. They are also the reason two neighbors with identical demographics receive identical mail and vote in opposite directions.

People do not decide as categories. They decide as individuals, under pressure, with whatever they happened to pay attention to that month. That attention leaves traces — what someone reads, buys, searches, cancels, renews, drives past on the way to work. Read carefully and modeled properly, those traces describe a person far better than the file does: what they are anxious about, what they take pride in, whom they trust, and what they have quietly stopped believing.

Brushworks was built to work at that resolution. We do the research, the modeling, the message architecture and the delivery ourselves, through our own media seats, and we measure every program against a held-out control — so that what we report at the end is what actually happened.

What we doThe method, in five movements

Terrain, audience, message, delivery, proof.

The order matters. Nothing is built before the race is mapped; nothing is written before the deciders are named; nothing is reported that was not measured against a control.

Capabilities in full

  1. I

    Terrain

    Where the race will actually be decided: the precincts, the margin, the money coming against you, and the clock.

  2. II

    Audience

    Deciders identified by what they do rather than by label, and grouped by what would move them.

  3. III

    Message

    A narrative track for each group, built from the anxieties and hopes it already holds and sequenced for the persuasion arc.

  4. IV

    Delivery

    Three registers: precision paid media, organic advocacy, and the ambient campaign. All of it disclosed, all of it through our own seats.

  5. V

    Proof

    Randomized holdouts, daily measurement, and a publish gate no model passes without beating the baseline.

The human layerExhibit 1

One person, seventeen thousand signals.

Our view of the American electorate is assembled from roughly sixty-two billion observed behaviors, resolved to more than 270 million adults and their households, organized into a ten-thousand-topic dictionary, and scored by models trained on real outcomes rather than proxies.

No single signal is decisive. The pattern is. A subscription cancelled, a commute lengthened, a local news habit, a sudden interest in prescription prices — each is noise on its own and evidence together. The graph is rebuilt monthly, digital activity refreshed daily, and none of it touches ethnicity, religion or ideology, which we do not model.

Inside the human layer

Exhibit 1The active signal registry, drawn to scale by domain — roughly 17,000 signals, each line a family of observed behaviors. Ochre marks signals that entered a scored model this month. Grouping illustrative.
From the behavioral lexiconExhibit 2, composites, not individuals

A campaign speaks to millions. It persuades one at a time.

Every other vendor in politics starts from the voter file, because that is what there is to buy: age band, sex, party, precinct, vote history. It is enough to send mail. It is not enough to know what to say. We describe deciders as phenotypes — composite people assembled from thousands of behavioral neighbors — so that a strategist and a copywriter can hold an entire segment in mind as a single person, and so that the person receives a line that was written for her.

Exhibit 2The same voter, two ways. Left, everything the voter file knows about the Night Nurse. Right, what the human layer knows — signals color-coded by domain, six scores, and the track she was assigned. Composite; the file's fields are typical, the signals illustrative.
  • Behavior, not labels.

    Cohorts are built from what people do — sixty-two billion observed events — never from ethnicity, religion or party as a proxy for what they will do.

    The category default: age band, sex, party, precinct

  • Named, and written for.

    Each cohort is a person with a name, a narrative track and a register mix. Copy is written to her; the studio produces the variants; every one carries a disclosure.

    The category default: one message, three demographic cuts

  • Measured against a control.

    Every track is judged against a randomized holdout. A line that moves the Steward and suppresses the Pharmacist is caught in week two, not guessed at in November.

    The category default: a post-election poll

The Steward

n., first-ring suburb

Homeowner, twenty years at the same employer, runs the parish fish fry. Believes the deal has been broken by people who never had to keep one.

Reads as
Order, obligation, the fair deal
Moves on
Cost-of-living arithmetic told with respect, not alarm

"The people who wrote the last budget never had to keep one."

The Splitter

n., late-deciding

Has voted for both parties in the last four cycles and resents being told what she is. Decides in the final ten days, mostly on character.

Reads as
Independence
Moves on
The single credible detail, not the platform

"Two votes, two dates, on the record. Judge them yourself."

The Night Nurse

n., shift worker

Mid-career, watches the news on a phone between rounds, has no patience for anyone who has not done a hard job under pressure.

Reads as
Competence
Moves on
Proof that someone has carried weight and kept their head

"She ran a trauma floor for eleven years. You'll hear she has never run anything."

The Renter

n., downtown, under 35

Three employers on the résumé, a lease that resets every twelve months, and a commute that has quietly become the central fact of life.

Reads as
Momentum
Moves on
A candidate who names the rent and the commute in the first sentence

"Your lease resets in March. Your rent didn't ask permission."

The Pharmacist

n., exurban professional

Meticulous about sources, allergic to slogans, and will read the footnote if there is one. Trusts the messenger who shows the working.

Reads as
Skepticism
Moves on
The claim with its evidence attached

"Here is the ratio she wrote, the hospital that adopted it, and the audit that followed."

The Contractor

n., rural-exurban, self-employed

Runs a crew of four, bids every job against someone cheaper, and keeps his own books at the kitchen table on Sunday nights.

Reads as
Self-reliance
Moves on
The rule that cost him a week, named specifically

"Section 4 cost you a week in March. Here is who wrote it and who voted to repeal it."

Commerce Media Civic Household Health and work Bars show the signal domains that define each composite

The recordExhibits 3 to 5

Ninety-six in a hundred.

Across more than five hundred contests — presidential, gubernatorial, Senate and House, ballot measures, and over a hundred bond and levy elections — the programs we have designed have won ninety-six percent of the time, for candidates and causes across the spectrum. Client names are held under agreement. The methods and the margins are not.

Open the casebook

Exhibit 3Five hundred contests, one dot each. Ochre, won; bone, lost. Drawn from the firm's record across a decade; positions of the losses are schematic.
OfficeMethodNote
PresidentialHyper-localization of a national narrativeA 2016 national campaign; the message rewritten county by county for the places that decided it.
GubernatorialBehavioral targeting across three distinct strategiesThree competitive states, three different theories of the race, one measurement standard.
U.S. SenateThe neglect algorithmPersuadable voters both parties had stopped contacting, found and moved.
U.S. HouseGrassroots amplificationSmall-dollar and volunteer growth engineered from behavioral affinity, not lists.
Ballot measuresSimplifying complexityA 2022 California measure: 65 percent support at launch, 17.7 percent at the ballot.
Bonds and leviesConcrete, not abstractMore than a hundred measures; more than five billion dollars approved by voters raising their own taxes.
Committees and NGOsThe permanent campaignTrigger-based activation between cycles, so the audience is warm when it matters.
Exhibit 4The record, by office. Each method is a case in the casebook.
Exhibit 5Support for a 2022 California ballot measure. The launch figure is the campaign's baseline polling; the result is the official statewide vote of November 8, 2022 (17.7 percent yes). The intervening trajectory is drawn to scale between them. Program in field from the second month.
CasebookThree of nine

What the method did when it met a real race.

  • Simplifying complexity

    A California measure whose text ran to dozens of pages, at 65 percent support, defeated with 17.7 percent of the vote — one true sentence per voter.

  • The neglect algorithm

    The persuadable, likely voters both parties had stopped calling, found by cross-referencing contact history with receptivity.

  • Ten million, five countries

    A diaspora treated as the constituency it is, across the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, the UAE and Australia.

All nine cases

AbroadExhibit 6

The harder theaters.

The same discipline travels. Our people have run engagement, security and narrative programs for governments and institutions in the Gulf, South Asia, Southeast Asia and West Africa, and diaspora programs in five countries at once. Seven offices sit on a single desk, so a mandate in Riyadh and a race in Michigan are watched by someone who is awake.

Where we have worked

Diaspora as an electorate. A ten-million-person community spread across five countries is a constituency, whether or not anyone treats it as one. We do.

Featured readFrom the Brushworks Review
Also in the ReviewAll twenty-four papers
    The rules we work byFive things we will not do

    Five things we will not do.

    Written into every engagement letter, and the first page a donor's counsel or a ministry's compliance office is shown.

    I

    Target on identity

    We model behavior only. Ethnicity, religion and ideology are never modeled, never bought, and never accepted as a filter.

    So the Steward can be any color and any faith.

    II

    Hide the messenger

    Paid advocacy is labeled. We do not operate undisclosed personas or accounts, on any platform, in any language, for any client.

    So the second voice is a real one.

    III

    Report without a control

    Every program carries a randomized holdout sealed on day five, and every model beats a demographic and a look-alike baseline before it ships.

    So the number in the report is the number that happened.

    IV

    Cross a wall

    Independent-expenditure work is separated from candidate work by structure — teams, systems and seats. Foreign work is registered before it begins.

    So a donor's counsel can certify the posture, not take our word for it.

    V

    Run what we could not describe

    If a program could not be explained on the record, in public, in the client's name and ours, we do not run it. Mandates that fail the test are declined in writing.

    So there is nothing to find.

    WP-01 — Persuasion

    The neglect algorithm

    Both parties keep contact histories. Both, over time, stop calling the same people. The method that finds the most valuable voter in the state — the one nobody’s list has on it.

    By Adam SyedSeptember 2026Working paper

    Abstract. Party and campaign contact histories, read as a record of who has been written off rather than who has been reached, identify a population of persuadable, likely voters that neither side is speaking to. We describe how contact history is cross-referenced with behavioral receptivity and turnout propensity, what the resulting population looks like in three competitive states, and why it is both cheaper to reach and more responsive than the voters campaigns compete over.

    In brief

    The finding
    Both parties’ contact histories, read together, reveal a large population of persuadable, likely voters that neither side is speaking to; measured against a control, they move more than any other group, at lower cost.
    For a campaign
    Ask for both sides’ records, add the unreached pool to the county board, and reach the neglected in a register that does not resemble the contact that failed.
    For a government or institution
    The same method finds the constituencies an institution has stopped addressing — the members, communities and publics its own outreach has written off.

    Every campaign in America keeps a diary of whom it has given up on. It does not call the diary that. It calls it contact history — the record, kept in the voter file and the dialer and the mail vendor's suppression list, of who answered, who gave, who signed, who opened, and who did none of those things. Read one way, contact history is a record of reach. Read the other way, it is a record of neglect: a list of the people both parties have quietly stopped speaking to. This paper is about the second reading, and about what happens when a program is built on it.

    The problem with reach

    The modern campaign is organized around a single loop. It buys or builds a universe, contacts the universe, records the responses, and reallocates toward the responders. Every cycle the loop tightens. The voters who answer the door, take the survey, open the email and give twenty dollars are contacted more; the voters who do none of those things are contacted less, then not at all. The loop is rational at the level of a single campaign with a finite budget. At the level of the electorate it produces a strange result: a growing population of persuadable, likely voters whom nobody is trying to persuade.

    The evidence that this population exists is not exotic. Field experiments on general-election persuasion have found average effects close to zero for most campaign contact — Kalla and Broockman's 2018 pooling of forty-nine experiments is the standard reference — and the most common explanation is saturation: the voters campaigns reach are the voters everyone reaches, and the marginal message lands on a person who has already heard twelve. The corollary is rarely stated. If effects vanish where contact is dense, they should survive where contact is thin. The question is whether the thinly contacted voters are persuadable at all, or whether they were dropped for good reason.

    How an electorate divides by contact history once both parties' records are read together. The two ochre bars — dropped after one contact, never contacted — hold more than two in five registered voters in the states we pooled. Illustrative shares, rounded.

    Reading the diary backward

    Our method begins by treating contact history as a variable rather than as a workflow. For each registered voter we assemble, from the client's file and its vendors' logs, a compact record: contacted by which side, through which channels, how many times, and with what recorded response. We then invert it. The variable of interest is not "responded" but "was written off": the voter who was contacted once and never again, or never at all, in the last two cycles.

    Written-off voters are then scored on two dimensions the file cannot see. The first is turnout propensity, modeled from recorded participation and from behavior — stable address tenure, civic and community activity, media habit — rather than from participation alone, because a file-only turnout model reproduces the file's blind spots. The second is receptivity: the modeled probability that contact of a given kind changes what the person does, trained on recorded outcomes from prior programs against a sealed holdout. A voter who is likely to vote and likely to move, and whom nobody has spoken to, is the most valuable person in the state, and she is on no one's list.

    The assembly rail for a neglected-persuadable program in a statewide race. Nearly half the electorate has been dropped or never contacted; a quarter of those are likely voters; a quarter of those are persuadable; almost all of those are reachable today through the seats. The line at the bottom is the one that matters: not one attribute the campaign already had was used to find them.
    Why the file cannot do this alone. Contact history is the file's own record of its behavior, not the voter's. It tells you the campaign stopped calling; it cannot tell you whether the voter would have answered a different question. Behavior supplies the second half: the person who never answered a phone poll but reads the county budget story to the end is not unreachable. She is unreached.

    What the neglected do when someone finally speaks to them

    In three competitive statewide programs across the 2022 and 2024 cycles we ran the same test. Within each contact-history group we drew a randomized holdout before any spend, delivered the program to the remainder, and measured favorability and reported intent against the control at week eight. The pattern was consistent in direction across all three: lift was smallest among the voters both sides had contacted repeatedly, larger among voters one side had contacted, and largest among the dropped and the never-contacted — with confidence intervals that separate the neglected groups from the crowded one, and do not separate the two neglected groups from each other.

    Favorability lift at week eight by contact-history group, treated minus sealed holdout, with ninety-percent intervals, pooled across three statewide programs. The crowded voters barely move; the neglected move most. Figures rounded; program-level results are reported to each client with its own intervals.

    Two features of the result deserve emphasis. The first is cost. Neglected voters are, by construction, not on the lists the platforms and the mail houses price against; the marginal contact costs less because nobody else is bidding for it. The second is durability. Effects among the crowded voters decayed within the week, as the literature on advertising decay would predict — Gerber, Gimpel, Green and Shaw found the effects of televised ads dissipating within a week or two — while effects among the neglected decayed more slowly, consistent with the intuition that a first message lands differently from a thirteenth. We treat this as suggestive rather than established; the programs were not designed to measure decay, and we report it as a hypothesis for the next cycle's design.

    Two objections

    The dropped were dropped for a reason. Sometimes. A voter who hung up twice is a poor prospect for a third call. But the reason is specific to the channel and the message, not to the person, and the file records the channel and the message it used. A program that reaches the dropped voter through a different register — a validator she trusts, a mailer about the specific thing she reads about, a thirty-second piece on the phone she actually uses at the hour she actually uses it — is not repeating the failed contact. It is making a first one.

    The neglected are simply low-propensity voters. Some are, and the turnout model screens them out; the program spends nothing on a person who will not vote. The finding is that a large share of the neglected are not low-propensity at all. They are voters whose participation the file records and whose persuadability it has never tested, because testing it would have required a question the campaign never asked.

    Implications for a plan

    • Ask for both sides' records. A campaign sees its own contact history. The neglected are found where both parties' histories are read together; where the opponent's record is unavailable, public contact patterns — canvass density, mail volume by precinct — stand in for it.
    • Budget by contact density, not by margin alone. The county board should carry a third column: the modeled pool of persuadable, likely voters neither side is reaching. It disagrees with the margin column more often than most managers expect.
    • Contact the neglected in a different register. The first message should not resemble the contact that failed. Validators and precision placement are cheaper here than anywhere else in the plan.
    • Seal a holdout inside the group. The claim is measurable and should be measured; a program that cannot show the neglected moved against a control has not shown anything.

    A campaign is a machine for finding the people who agree with it. The neglect algorithm is a machine for finding the people it has stopped looking for. The second machine is cheaper to run and, in a close race, is where the margin is.

    Notes and references

    1. Kalla, J. L., and Broockman, D. E. (2018). The minimal persuasive effects of campaign contact in general elections: evidence from 49 field experiments. American Political Science Review, 112(1), 148–166.
    2. Gerber, A. S., Gimpel, J. G., Green, D. P., and Shaw, D. R. (2011). How large and long-lasting are the persuasive effects of televised campaign ads? Results from a randomized field experiment. American Political Science Review, 105(1), 135–150.
    3. Hersh, E. D. (2015). Hacking the Electorate: How Campaigns Perceive Voters. Cambridge University Press — on the file as a record of the campaign's perception rather than the voter's disposition.
    4. Coppock, A., Hill, S. J., and Vavreck, L. (2020). The small effects of political advertising are small regardless of context, message, sender, or receiver. Science Advances, 6(36).
    5. Program figures in this paper are pooled and rounded from three Brushworks statewide programs, 2022–2024, each measured against a sealed randomized holdout drawn before spend; client identities are held under agreement.
    Next paperThe Review

    Brief us.

    Tell us the race, the calendar and the margin. Within a week we will tell you whether we can move it and what it would take. Candidate work and independent-expenditure work are taken by separate teams; say which you are. Governments and institutions: tell us the mandate and the jurisdiction, and we will tell you what registration it requires before we say anything else.

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