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WP-33: Terrain

Sixteen districts: what became of the swing voter

In 1984, about 190 congressional districts voted for one party for president and the other for the House. In 2024, sixteen did. The swing voter did not disappear. She moved to the decisions where the party label does not reach.

By Brushworks research deskNovember 2026Working paper

Abstract. Split-ticket outcomes have nearly vanished from American federal elections: sixteen House districts in 2020 and in 2024 split their presidential and House votes, against about 190 in the landslides of 1972 and 1984, and only three states will send a split Senate delegation to the 119th Congress, the fewest since popular election of senators began. We read the decline from the record, separate what it says about partisanship from what it says about persuasion, and set out where the persuadable voter still decides elections: in the choice to vote, in ballot measures and local races, and in primaries.

In brief

The finding
Party-switching at the top of the ticket has collapsed. Movement has not. It now happens between voting and staying home, and in contests without a party label.
For a campaign
Plan persuasion where the party cue is weak and mobilization where it is strong. In a partisan general election, the swing voter is usually a sometimes-voter.
For an institution or a ballot committee
Measures and local races are where cross-party majorities still form. They are decided by people who agree with the other party on almost everything else.

For most of the twentieth century American voters split their tickets often enough to keep both parties in power at once. In the Nixon and Reagan landslides, about 190 House districts voted for one party for president and the other for Congress.1 In 2020 the number was sixteen, and in 2024 it was sixteen again.2, 3 This paper reads that decline, asks what it means for persuasion, and sets out where the voter who can still be moved now makes up her mind.

The record

The count of split districts fell in steps. At least 145 districts split in 1988.4 By 2000 the number was 86, and after a brief rise to 83 in 2008 it fell to 26 in 2012, 35 in 2016 and 16 in 2020.2, 3 The Senate shows the same pattern: in the incoming 119th Congress, only Maine, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin will have senators from different parties, the fewest split delegations since direct election began in 1914.5

House districts voting for one party for president and the other for the House. Counts from Pew Research Center, Brookings and the Crystal Ball; earlier years rounded as published.

Two things drove most of the fall. The old split was regional: between 1972 and 1988, 41 percent of split districts were in the South, where conservative voters backed Republican presidents and Democratic members of Congress.4 As that realignment completed, the splits went with it. The second is nationalization: voters increasingly treat a House race as a vote on the national parties, and dislike of the other party has become a stronger motive than attachment to one’s own.6, 7

The voters who did move

None of this means that no one changes their mind. In 2016, 206 counties that had voted twice for Barack Obama voted for Donald Trump. They cast 5.5 percent of the national vote and accounted for 51 percent of the Republican net gain from 2012.8, 9 Small, concentrated movement still decides presidential elections.

The pivot counties of 2016: a small share of the vote, a large share of the change.

The same counties show how durable a shift can be once it happens. By 2024, 179 of the 206 had voted for the Republican nominee three times running. The other 27 voted Democratic at least once afterward: 16 in 2020 only, 9 in both 2020 and 2024, and 2 in 2024 only.10

What became of the 206 pivot counties after 2016.

Where persuasion now happens

If voters rarely switch parties within a ballot, they still decide many things. Four decisions remain open to persuasion, and each needs a different program.

  • Whether to vote. In a nationalized general election, the voter whose choice can change the result is often the one deciding whether to show up. That is a mobilization job, and it is measured in turnout against a control.
  • Ballot measures. A measure carries no party label. Voters who agree with one party on almost everything else regularly cross on a specific question, and the published experiments find persuasion effects there that they do not find in partisan general elections.11
  • Local and nonpartisan races. School boards, city councils and county offices are often decided without a party cue, by small electorates that skew older (WP-35).
  • Primaries. Within a party, the label is the same on every candidate, and the voter has to decide on something else.
Where the party cue is weak, persuasion has room to work. A qualitative reading of the record and the experimental literature.

How the split ticket ended

The split ticket of the 1970s and 1980s was, more than anything, a Southern institution. In 1972, two thirds of all Southern House districts voted for one party’s presidential nominee and the other’s candidate for Congress. As recently as 1988 more than half still did. Between 1972 and 1988, 41 percent of all split districts in the country were in the South, and more than nine in ten split districts nationally voted Republican for president and Democratic for the House.4

The pattern had a plain cause. Conservative Southern voters had moved to Republican presidential candidates a generation before they moved to Republican members of Congress, many of whom did not yet exist. Long-serving Democratic incumbents held their seats on personal standing, seniority and local service. As those members retired and Republican candidates contested the seats, the split closed. By 2012, voters in only eight Southern districts split their presidential and House votes, five percent of the country’s split districts that year.4

The South and the split ticket. Bar lengths approximate the shares as Pew Research Center describes them.

Outside the South, the decline followed a slower and broader change. Voters came to see House elections as choices between national parties, local news that once covered members of Congress closely thinned out, and the share of voters who dislike the other party more than they like their own rose.6, 7 A member’s local record, which used to win the votes of people who disagreed with her party, now buys less.

The lesson for a campaign is not that local standing is worthless. It is that local standing has to be carried to the voter by the campaign itself, because the institutions that once carried it, from the local paper to the party organization, carry much less of it now.

How to find a persuadable voter in a nationalized electorate

If the persuadable voter rarely switches parties, she is found by what else she does. Four kinds of behavior separate her from the settled partisan, and all of them can be read without asking about identity.

  • Her vote history across contest types. A voter who votes in presidential years and skips midterms, primaries and local elections decides each time whether to vote at all.
  • Her ballot behavior below the top line. Roll-off (leaving lower races blank) and crossing on measures show a voter who decides question by question.
  • Her attention. A voter who follows the race closely has usually decided. One who reads local news and little national politics often has not.
  • Her recent changes. A move, a new job, a new child or a new bill changes what a voter is listening for, and often whether she votes.
Behaviors that separate the persuadable from the settled, and what each suggests. A qualitative reading.

A worked example: one state’s persuadable pool

The figures in this example are illustrative, for an invented competitive state. Of every hundred registered voters, a campaign might find that about four are plausible switchers at the top of the ticket, about fourteen are sometime voters who lean one way and decide whether to vote, and about ten are cross-pressured on a measure on the same ballot. The remaining seventy-two have settled both their party and their habit of voting.

One invented state’s registered voters by the decision still open to them. Illustrative.

A plan written for the four would spend its persuasion budget fighting for a small and contested group. A plan written for all three groups spends most of its money on the fourteen and the ten, and measures each program against its own control.

Objections

Turnout is not persuasion. For a campaign, it is the same decision in a different form: whether this voter’s choice counts this time. The voter who leans your way and stays home is the most valuable persuasion target in a nationalized election.

Many voters call themselves independent. They do, Most of them lean toward one party and vote like its partisans.12 A self-description is a weak guide to a vote; a record of behavior is a better one.

Ticket-splitting will come back. It may. If it does, the voters who return to it will show it first in their ballot behavior below the top line, and a program that reads behavior will see them before a program that reads party registration.

Questions to ask of a targeting plan

  • How many voters does the plan count as persuadable, and by what behavior?
  • How many of them are switchers, and how many are sometime voters deciding whether to vote?
  • Is there a measure on the same ballot, and who crosses on it?
  • What control will say whether the persuasion and turnout programs each worked?

Further reading

  • Hopkins, D. J. (2018), cited above: how American political behavior nationalized.
  • Abramowitz, A. I., and Webster, S. (2016), cited above: negative partisanship and the decline of split tickets.
  • Burden, B. C., and Kimball, D. C. (2002). Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government. University of Michigan Press: the account of split-ticket voting at its height.

Implications

For a campaign in a partisan general election. Count the persuadable voters with care, and expect them to be fewer than the plan assumes. Spend the persuasion budget early and on the people still undecided (WP-32), and treat most of the close as a turnout program.

For a ballot committee, a company or a public body. Measures and local questions are where cross-party majorities still form. They are won by finding the voters who agree with you on this question and not on much else, and by saying one sentence each of them can check (WP-03).

For anyone reading a map. A county that moved once can move again, and most of the ones that moved in 2016 did not move back. Read behavior across several cycles before assuming that last time’s margin is this time’s ceiling.

Notes and references

  1. Brownstein, R., in The Atlantic, as quoted by Ballotpedia; and Axios, July 2022.
  2. Brookings, Vital Statistics on Congress, table 2-16. Districts with split results by year.
  3. Crystal Ball (University of Virginia Center for Politics) counts for 2000 and 2024, as reported in Jacobson, L., “Presidential downballot losses: an updated history.”
  4. Pew Research Center, 2016: “Split-ticket districts, once common, are now rare.”
  5. Pew Research Center, November 26, 2024.
  6. Hopkins, D. J. (2018). The Increasingly United States: How and Why American Political Behavior Nationalized. University of Chicago Press.
  7. Abramowitz, A. I., and Webster, S. (2016). The rise of negative partisanship and the nationalization of U.S. elections in the 21st century. Electoral Studies, 41, 12–22.
  8. Ballotpedia, Pivot Counties; and Ballotpedia, March 20, 2017.
  9. Ballotpedia, Pivot Counties: Looking at the historical voting patterns of the 206 Obama-Obama-Trump counties.
  10. Ballotpedia, 2024 update, as of November 12, 2024.
  11. Kalla, J. L., and Broockman, D. E. (2018). The minimal persuasive effects of campaign contact in general elections: evidence from 49 field experiments. American Political Science Review, 112(1), 148–166.
  12. Petrocik, J. R. (2009). Measuring party support: leaners are not independents. Electoral Studies, 28(4), 562–572.

Basis of figures. Split-district counts as published by Pew Research Center, Brookings and the Crystal Ball; 1972 and 1984 rounded to about 190 as published. Pivot-county figures from Ballotpedia. The exhibits on where persuasion happens and on behavioral signals are qualitative readings; the state pool is illustrative. No Brushworks program figures appear in this paper.

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