Brushworks
Brief us

Political strategy and data, at human resolution

Elections are decided by people, not demographics. We work at that scale.

Brushworks is a political intelligence firm. We model how individual voters behave, determine what would move each of them, and put persuasion into the field with a standard of proof — across the United States and in the harder theaters abroad.

  1. 1. The file
  2. 2. Signals resolve
  3. 3. Deciders surface
  4. 4. A program in field
Plate IFour thousand people as the voter file sees them: identical rows, nothing to tell one from another.
500+contests, from presidential to school board, over a decade
96%won, across every level and both parties
$5B+approved in more than a hundred bond and levy measures
270M+American adults and households, resolved and behaviorally scored
12countries of institutional and diaspora work
7offices on a single 24-hour desk
The premise

Most campaigns still buy the electorate the way television networks sold it in 1985: by age, sex, county and party file. Those labels are easy to purchase and easy to defend in a budget meeting. They are also the reason two neighbors with identical demographics receive identical mail and vote in opposite directions.

People do not decide as categories. They decide as individuals, under pressure, with whatever they happened to pay attention to that month. That attention leaves traces — what someone reads, buys, searches, cancels, renews, drives past on the way to work. Read carefully and modeled properly, those traces describe a person far better than the file does: what they are anxious about, what they take pride in, whom they trust, and what they have quietly stopped believing.

Brushworks was built to work at that resolution. We do the research, the modeling, the message architecture and the delivery ourselves, through our own media seats, and we measure every program against a held-out control — so that what we report at the end is what actually happened.

What we doThe method, in five movements

Terrain, audience, message, delivery, proof.

The order matters. Nothing is built before the race is mapped; nothing is written before the deciders are named; nothing is reported that was not measured against a control.

Capabilities in full

  1. I

    Terrain

    Where the race will actually be decided: the precincts, the margin, the money coming against you, and the clock.

  2. II

    Audience

    Deciders identified by what they do rather than by label, and grouped by what would move them.

  3. III

    Message

    A narrative track for each group, built from the anxieties and hopes it already holds and sequenced for the persuasion arc.

  4. IV

    Delivery

    Three registers: precision paid media, organic advocacy, and the ambient campaign. All of it disclosed, all of it through our own seats.

  5. V

    Proof

    Randomized holdouts, daily measurement, and a publish gate no model passes without beating the baseline.

The human layerExhibit 1

One person, seventeen thousand signals.

Our view of the American electorate is assembled from roughly sixty-two billion observed behaviors, resolved to more than 270 million adults and their households, organized into a ten-thousand-topic dictionary, and scored by models trained on real outcomes rather than proxies.

No single signal is decisive. The pattern is. A subscription cancelled, a commute lengthened, a local news habit, a sudden interest in prescription prices — each is noise on its own and evidence together. The graph is rebuilt monthly, digital activity refreshed daily, and none of it touches ethnicity, religion or ideology, which we do not model.

Inside the human layer

Exhibit 1The active signal registry, drawn to scale by domain — roughly 17,000 signals, each line a family of observed behaviors. Ochre marks signals that entered a scored model this month. Grouping illustrative.
From the behavioral lexiconExhibit 2, composites, not individuals

A campaign speaks to millions. It persuades one at a time.

Every other vendor in politics starts from the voter file, because that is what there is to buy: age band, sex, party, precinct, vote history. It is enough to send mail. It is not enough to know what to say. We describe deciders as phenotypes — composite people assembled from thousands of behavioral neighbors — so that a strategist and a copywriter can hold an entire segment in mind as a single person, and so that the person receives a line that was written for her.

Exhibit 2The same voter, two ways. Left, everything the voter file knows about the Night Nurse. Right, what the human layer knows — signals color-coded by domain, six scores, and the track she was assigned. Composite; the file's fields are typical, the signals illustrative.
  • Behavior, not labels.

    Cohorts are built from what people do — sixty-two billion observed events — never from ethnicity, religion or party as a proxy for what they will do.

    The category default: age band, sex, party, precinct

  • Named, and written for.

    Each cohort is a person with a name, a narrative track and a register mix. Copy is written to her; the studio produces the variants; every one carries a disclosure.

    The category default: one message, three demographic cuts

  • Measured against a control.

    Every track is judged against a randomized holdout. A line that moves the Steward and suppresses the Pharmacist is caught in week two, not guessed at in November.

    The category default: a post-election poll

The Steward

n., first-ring suburb

Homeowner, twenty years at the same employer, runs the parish fish fry. Believes the deal has been broken by people who never had to keep one.

Reads as
Order, obligation, the fair deal
Moves on
Cost-of-living arithmetic told with respect, not alarm

"The people who wrote the last budget never had to keep one."

The Splitter

n., late-deciding

Has voted for both parties in the last four cycles and resents being told what she is. Decides in the final ten days, mostly on character.

Reads as
Independence
Moves on
The single credible detail, not the platform

"Two votes, two dates, on the record. Judge them yourself."

The Night Nurse

n., shift worker

Mid-career, watches the news on a phone between rounds, has no patience for anyone who has not done a hard job under pressure.

Reads as
Competence
Moves on
Proof that someone has carried weight and kept their head

"She ran a trauma floor for eleven years. You'll hear she has never run anything."

The Renter

n., downtown, under 35

Three employers on the résumé, a lease that resets every twelve months, and a commute that has quietly become the central fact of life.

Reads as
Momentum
Moves on
A candidate who names the rent and the commute in the first sentence

"Your lease resets in March. Your rent didn't ask permission."

The Pharmacist

n., exurban professional

Meticulous about sources, allergic to slogans, and will read the footnote if there is one. Trusts the messenger who shows the working.

Reads as
Skepticism
Moves on
The claim with its evidence attached

"Here is the ratio she wrote, the hospital that adopted it, and the audit that followed."

The Contractor

n., rural-exurban, self-employed

Runs a crew of four, bids every job against someone cheaper, and keeps his own books at the kitchen table on Sunday nights.

Reads as
Self-reliance
Moves on
The rule that cost him a week, named specifically

"Section 4 cost you a week in March. Here is who wrote it and who voted to repeal it."

Commerce Media Civic Household Health and work Bars show the signal domains that define each composite

The recordExhibits 3 to 5

Ninety-six in a hundred.

Across more than five hundred contests — presidential, gubernatorial, Senate and House, ballot measures, and over a hundred bond and levy elections — the programs we have designed have won ninety-six percent of the time, for candidates and causes across the spectrum. Client names are held under agreement. The methods and the margins are not.

Open the casebook

Exhibit 3Five hundred contests, one dot each. Ochre, won; bone, lost. Drawn from the firm's record across a decade; positions of the losses are schematic.
OfficeMethodNote
PresidentialHyper-localization of a national narrativeA 2016 national campaign; the message rewritten county by county for the places that decided it.
GubernatorialBehavioral targeting across three distinct strategiesThree competitive states, three different theories of the race, one measurement standard.
U.S. SenateThe neglect algorithmPersuadable voters both parties had stopped contacting, found and moved.
U.S. HouseGrassroots amplificationSmall-dollar and volunteer growth engineered from behavioral affinity, not lists.
Ballot measuresSimplifying complexityA 2022 California measure: 65 percent support at launch, 17.7 percent at the ballot.
Bonds and leviesConcrete, not abstractMore than a hundred measures; more than five billion dollars approved by voters raising their own taxes.
Committees and NGOsThe permanent campaignTrigger-based activation between cycles, so the audience is warm when it matters.
Exhibit 4The record, by office. Each method is a case in the casebook.
Exhibit 5Support for a 2022 California ballot measure. The launch figure is the campaign's baseline polling; the result is the official statewide vote of November 8, 2022 (17.7 percent yes). The intervening trajectory is drawn to scale between them. Program in field from the second month.
CasebookThree of nine

What the method did when it met a real race.

  • Simplifying complexity

    A California measure whose text ran to dozens of pages, at 65 percent support, defeated with 17.7 percent of the vote — one true sentence per voter.

  • The neglect algorithm

    The persuadable, likely voters both parties had stopped calling, found by cross-referencing contact history with receptivity.

  • Ten million, five countries

    A diaspora treated as the constituency it is, across the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, the UAE and Australia.

All nine cases

AbroadExhibit 6

The harder theaters.

The same discipline travels. Our people have run engagement, security and narrative programs for governments and institutions in the Gulf, South Asia, Southeast Asia and West Africa, and diaspora programs in five countries at once. Seven offices sit on a single desk, so a mandate in Riyadh and a race in Michigan are watched by someone who is awake.

Where we have worked

Diaspora as an electorate. A ten-million-person community spread across five countries is a constituency, whether or not anyone treats it as one. We do.

Featured readFrom the Brushworks Review
Also in the ReviewAll twenty-four papers
    The rules we work byFive things we will not do

    Five things we will not do.

    Written into every engagement letter, and the first page a donor's counsel or a ministry's compliance office is shown.

    I

    Target on identity

    We model behavior only. Ethnicity, religion and ideology are never modeled, never bought, and never accepted as a filter.

    So the Steward can be any color and any faith.

    II

    Hide the messenger

    Paid advocacy is labeled. We do not operate undisclosed personas or accounts, on any platform, in any language, for any client.

    So the second voice is a real one.

    III

    Report without a control

    Every program carries a randomized holdout sealed on day five, and every model beats a demographic and a look-alike baseline before it ships.

    So the number in the report is the number that happened.

    IV

    Cross a wall

    Independent-expenditure work is separated from candidate work by structure — teams, systems and seats. Foreign work is registered before it begins.

    So a donor's counsel can certify the posture, not take our word for it.

    V

    Run what we could not describe

    If a program could not be explained on the record, in public, in the client's name and ours, we do not run it. Mandates that fail the test are declined in writing.

    So there is nothing to find.

    WP-06 — Measurement

    A standard of proof

    Every campaign report flatters. A randomized holdout is the only way to know what the program did — what it costs, what it reveals, and why most vendors won’t run one.

    By Brushworks research deskSeptember 2026Working paper

    Abstract. We describe the randomized holdout as applied to political programs: how the control is drawn, sealed and protected from contamination, how lift is estimated with confidence intervals across registers, and how the same discipline governs which models are allowed to ship.

    In brief

    The finding
    Only a randomized control group, drawn before any spend and never contacted, can separate what a program did from what the race did; every other method flatters.
    For a campaign
    Ask every vendor to show you the control and the models it killed; budget ten percent of each cohort for the holdout; report lift with intervals, by register.
    For a government or institution
    A ministry or institution buying communication can require the same standard — and should treat a vendor that cannot produce a control as one that cannot know whether it worked.

    Every campaign report flatters. It flatters because the people writing it were paid to produce the outcome it describes, and because the tools they use to describe it — before-and-after polling, matched comparisons, platform attribution — are constructed to find effects where they are looked for. None of this is dishonesty. It is what measurement does when it is not designed to fail. The only measurement that can fail is one built around a control group, drawn at random before any money is spent, that never sees the program. This paper explains why that design is the standard of proof, what it costs, what it reveals, and why most vendors will not run one.

    Why the usual methods overstate

    A pre/post comparison among treated voters attributes to the program everything that happened during it — the debate, the news cycle, the opponent's collapse, the natural drift of a race. A matched comparison corrects for the observable differences between contacted and uncontacted voters and leaves the unobservable ones, which are exactly the ones that made the campaign contact one voter and not another. Platform attribution credits the last impression before an act the person may have been going to perform anyway. The advertising-measurement literature has quantified the gap: Gordon and colleagues, comparing observational methods against fifteen randomized experiments on a large platform, found the observational estimates often far from the experimental ones, and usually overstating lift; Lewis and Rao showed that even honest observational estimates of advertising returns are so noisy that selection swamps them. Political measurement inherits every one of these problems and adds a candidate who wants the number to be large.

    What three methods say about the same program. The pre/post estimate includes the whole race; the matched estimate includes the selection the campaign built in; the randomized estimate is the program. Illustrative magnitudes consistent with the observational-bias literature.

    The design

    The design is old and its logic is Fisher's. Before any spend, within each cohort the program will treat, a share of voters — usually ten percent — is drawn at random and sealed: never contacted by the program in any register, never uploaded to a seat, never mailed. The remainder is treated. Because assignment was random, the two groups are the same population in expectation, and every difference that opens between them afterward is the program, plus noise whose size is known. The holdout reports to the client directly and does not enter the delivery path; the firm that runs the program cannot reach it, which is the point.

    The measurement design. The holdout is sealed on day five, before any spend, and sits outside the delivery loop; the program is measured against it daily and reported weekly, with intervals, and the proof report at close carries the kill log.

    Three refinements make the design usable in a campaign rather than a laboratory. Outcomes are measured at the person, not the precinct, from recorded acts where possible — validated turnout, returned ballots, sign-ups, contributions — and from panel measurement where an act does not exist. Register-level holdouts allow the lift of precision paid, organic advocacy and ambient to be separated, so the plan can move weight toward what is working while the program runs. And intention-to-treat is the estimand: a voter assigned to treatment who was never reached counts as treated, because the plan's failure to reach her is part of what is being measured.

    What it costs

    A holdout costs the program the votes it would have moved in the ten percent it did not contact, and it costs precision when the outcome is rare. The second cost is the one that matters. For an outcome with a base rate near half — favorability, intent — a holdout of ten thousand voters, compared with a treated group of similar size measured on the same instrument, detects a lift of about two points at conventional power; five thousand detects about three; two thousand detects between four and five. A larger treated group tightens the interval, but the holdout sets the floor. A statewide program with a hundred thousand voters in its treated cohorts has holdouts large enough to see what it needs to see. A congressional program with a fifth of that has to choose which registers it can afford to measure and which it must pool.

    Minimum detectable lift by holdout size at eighty percent power and a five percent two-sided test, for an outcome with a base rate near forty-five percent, against a treated group of similar size. Below a few thousand voters the design can only see large effects; the terrain brief says which.
    Why ten percent. Smaller holdouts save votes and lose the ability to detect the effects a program actually produces, which are single digits. Larger holdouts cost votes the campaign can feel. Ten percent is the point at which a statewide program can measure each register separately and a manager will still sign the plan; it is a compromise, and it is written down as one.

    What the holdout reveals that nothing else does

    • Backfire. A cohort in which treated voters move the wrong way against the control is visible in week two. No other method can see it, because no other method has a group that was left alone.
    • Decay. Treated and control lines that converge after an effect show how long the effect lasts, which the advertising literature says is days for most messages and longer for a few.
    • Register lift. Which of the three registers is moving the number and which is riding along.
    • Nothing. The most valuable report is the one that says a line, a register or a cohort did not move, in time to stop paying for it.

    Why most vendors will not run one

    A holdout can produce a proof report that says the program did less than the campaign hoped, in a number the campaign can check. It requires the vendor to give up ten percent of its addressable universe and to let the client see the control. It makes the difference between the race and the program visible, which is uncomfortable for everyone who was paid to conflate them. The vendors who run one are the vendors who expect to pass. The buyer's question is simple: show me the control, and show me the models you killed.

    Notes and references

    1. Gordon, B. R., Zettelmeyer, F., Bhargava, N., and Chapsky, D. (2019). A comparison of approaches to advertising measurement: evidence from big field experiments at Facebook. Marketing Science, 38(2), 193–225.
    2. Lewis, R. A., and Rao, J. M. (2015). The unfavorable economics of measuring the returns to advertising. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130(4), 1941–1973.
    3. Johnson, G. A., Lewis, R. A., and Nubbemeyer, E. I. (2017). Ghost ads: improving the economics of measuring online ad effectiveness. Journal of Marketing Research, 54(6), 867–884.
    4. Gerber, A. S., and Green, D. P. (2012). Field Experiments: Design, Analysis, and Interpretation. W. W. Norton — the standard treatment of intention-to-treat and power in political field experiments.
    5. Gerber, A. S., Gimpel, J. G., Green, D. P., and Shaw, D. R. (2011). How large and long-lasting are the persuasive effects of televised campaign ads? American Political Science Review, 105(1), 135–150.
    6. Brushworks Review methodology notes: holdout size, estimand and interval reporting.
    Next paperThe Review

    Brief us.

    Tell us the race, the calendar and the margin. Within a week we will tell you whether we can move it and what it would take. Candidate work and independent-expenditure work are taken by separate teams; say which you are. Governments and institutions: tell us the mandate and the jurisdiction, and we will tell you what registration it requires before we say anything else.

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